

ISLAM AND MULTICULTURALISM: CHALLENGE TO THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN INDONESIA¹

By: Anas Saidi²

Abstrak

Di tengah-tengah Indonesia yang sedang mendapatkan pujian dan sekaligus sorotan dunia: apakah negara Muslim terbesar di dunia ini akan berhasil mempertontonkan kapabilitas Islam dengan demokrasi. Ironisnya, sikap intoleran berbasis semangat keagamaan yang bercorak kekerasan terus mengalami peningkatan. Pranata demokrasi yang dengan susah payah diracik dari kemelut rezim Orde Baru yang otoriter, kini telah mendapatkan tantangan baru atas semangat teokrasi yang anti demokrasi, pluralisme, multikulturalisme yang bertentangan dengan prinsip *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*. Bayang-bayang politik keagamaan yang terus bercita-cita melembagakan model teokrasi, telah menjadi duri dalam daging untuk merayakan multikultural dan pluralitas sebagai kekayaan bangsa dalam menyambut demokrasi deliberatif. Di sana-sini gangguan konsiliasi demokrasi, tidak hanya disumbat oleh disfungsi pilar-pilar lembaga demokrasi yang terus berkuat pada demokrasi prosedural, tetapi juga, terdistorsi oleh cita-cita teokrasi yang tiada henti.

Jargon penegakkan Islam semurni-murninya tanpa tafsir (*kaffah*), yang serba menetapkan doktrin agama sebagai harga bandrol, telah mengabaikan prinsip, "*shalih likulli zaman wa makan*" (berlakunya nilai-nilai universalitas agama melampaui ruang dan waktu). Semangat tektualisasi yang memutlakkan tafsir, yang mudah jatuh pada instrumentalisasi kekerasan; ikut memberikan kontribusi negatif yang paling menggelisahkan atas kebutuhan kemapanan budaya demokrasi yang sedang dibangun. Pancasila sebagai konsensus bangsa yang merupakan *conditio sine qua non* bagi kondisi bangsa Indonesia yang plural dan multikultural, yang

¹This paper presented at Linkoping Universitet, Stockholm-Swedia, on 5 th May, 2011.

²Researcher at Indonesian Institute of Sciences-Centre for Social and Cultural Studies.

kini terus digugat dan dipersoalkan kembali, menjadi potret buram atas masa depan demokrasi di Indonesia.

Kata Kunci: Islam, multikulturalisme, demokrasi.

Abstract

Amids the world's attention to Indonesia, a question is raised: "will the world's largest Muslims country be able to show Islamic capabilities with democracy?" Ironically, intolerance based on religious spirits with their violent face has continued to increase. Democratic structure formulated after the demised of the New Order regime in 1998 is now facing a new challenge from the rise of theocracy that opposed democracy, pluralism, and multiculturalism. The rise of theocracy is essentially inconsistent with the "Unity in Diversity" principle. Religious politics struggling to institutionalized this theocracy model has become "the sand in the shoe" in the mids of Indonesia's celebration of multiculralism and pluralism embracing deliberative democracy. Obstacles to democratic reconciliation occured not only due to disfunction of democratic institutions that concentrate much on democratic procedure instead of substantive democracy; but also has been distorted by these theocracy ideals that continues to emerge.

The jargon to uphold Islam as a whole ("kaffah") stated religious views is un-negotiable, although this is actually in contrast with the Islamic principle, "shalih likulli zaman wa makan" (meaning: religious universality applies accross time and space). The effort to textualized with interpretation, can easily fall into the use of violence has given a negative contribution to the building of democracy. Pancasila as nation's concensus, a conditio sine quanon, for pluralistic and multiculture Indonesia, has now continued being disputed.

Keywords: Islam, multiculturalism, democracy

Introduction

As the largest country by Muslim population in the world, and is currently running the project of democracy, Indonesia faces a puzzling question: whether this nation-state of 240 million people would successfully have a substantial consolidated democracy, or would fall into a painful messy state. The hope and anxiety of the Indonesian future is partly associated with the political facts that only small number of Muslim countries in the world have successfully demonstrated that there

is an affinity between religion and democratic values. The delayed wave of democratization that swept the countries in the Middle East and Africa seems justifying some doubts about Islam, which is considered to have some ideological obstacles to bring democracy as the main basis of nationhood and statehood.

Meanwhile, those who are optimistic consider Indonesia as a state with a number of exceptions from the catalog of Muslim countries. These exceptions are not solely because most of Indonesian Moslem are the follower of *Sunni*³, who, by nature, tend to be moderate, but also, as a multiethnic and multicultural country, Indonesia already has a fundamental basis of culture formulated as a common willingness, namely the ideology of *Pancasila* (the Five Principles). *Pancasila* can be considered as a civic religion provides the basic principles and core values that became a common denominator to manage a shared public sphere. As a common denominator, it is important to avoid any form of monopoly to interpret it; instead, interpretation to *Pancasila* should be left open for public deliberation (Yudi Latif, 2008:14).

Unfortunately, the principle of unity in diversity (*Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*) that contains the ideality of multiculturalism in Indonesia is currently in the troubling disorder. Although there is no immigration problem as experienced by some countries like the United States of America, Australia, Germany, and Europe countries for generally, at least the current Indonesian problems require a number of answer. These problems are: *firstly*, how strong *Pancasila* as an ideology with its integrative function is able to sustain itself as a fundamental basis of the state policy, which is currently experiencing a serious threat: *secondly*, how far the process of Islamisation, which is now becoming a new trend (scripturalism, neo-Fundamentalist) and is leading to the process of "ideologizing religion" (by implementing the Islamic law), provides the

³*Sunni*, according to Ernest Gellner, is lack of structures and symbols that can generate fanaticism. He states that Islamic renewal movements promoted by the scripturalist and formalists has transformed Islam into a collection of norms. The typical form of *Sunni*, according to Gellner, has brought a systematic doctrine of textual interpretation which consists of "elements that as a whole they are in line with the conditions and spirit of the modern era" (Ernest Gellner, 1987: Binder 1988: 125). Within *Nahdlatul Ulama* (the biggest Islamic mass organization in Indonesia), this is renowned from the principle; "*al-Muhaafazhat-u 'ala' l-qadim al-Salih wal akhdzu bi' l-jadid- al-ashlah* (maintaining the good tradition and taking the new and better one).

willingness to liberalize itself to bring together a number of fundamental ideas with deliberative democracy. **Thirdly**, how can the "middle way" which sets Pancasila as the civic-religion (not a religious state and not a secular state), become the main basis for formulating the relationship between religion and state, so that "the twin tolerance"⁴ can be achieved.

On the first issue, it appears that Pancasila has failed to become guidance for the principles formulated within itself. In the implementation, Pancasila has lost its ability to be a referent of any actions and policies taken by the government. The failure of Pancasila, First of all, is not because of Pancasila does not have elements that bring together the common needs, but rather on the absence of consistency in its implementation. In fact, the elements that underlie the preamble of the 1945 Constitution tend to be fossilized values. In the economic sector, for example, as it is stated on article 33 of the 1945 Constitution, which positioned the people as the owners of economic sovereignty, there has been a shift to the paradigm of market fundamentalism. All the policies tend to be issued under the shadow of neo-liberalism, primarily through the Washington Consensus. Our natural resources (oil, mining, forests, etc.), approximately 80 percent of them, had been controlled by foreign capital.⁵ In the education sector, the plan to privatize 81 state universities

⁴"Twin Tolerance" refers to the situations whereas religious and state institutions recognize their limits of authority and then develop tolerance attitude toward each other functions. Democratic state institutions should be sterilized from any political pressures, as long as in line with constitutional and human rights principles, to issue any policies. In this regard, religious institutions should not have any privileges that constitutionally allow them to impose any public policy to the government which has been elected democratically. In reverse, individuals and religious communities should have full freedom to worship privately (see Stepan, 2005, as quoted by Yudi Latif in: "*Negara Paripurna: Historisitas, Rasionalitas, dan Aktualitas Pancasila*", Gramedia, 2011, hlm.101).

⁵M. Fadjroel Rachman, in his article (Kompas, 16th May, 2009), "*Republik Tanpa Alternatif* (Republic Without Alternative)", states that in the economic sector, the government in the reformation era seems only continuing the policies formulated by the New Order regime (neo-liberalism). This can be seen from the policy taken by SBY-Kalla and Megawati to sell oil and natural gas blocks, state-owned companies while having huge debt. Megawati made a contract for natural block "Tanggung" that is potentially suffering financial loss to IDR 750 trillion (25 years). Also, she sold cheaply Indosat at around IDR 5.62 trillion to Temasek Holding, which then is sold to Qtel (Qatar) worth US\$ 1.8 billion. Qtel has the control over Indosat, as it is permitted by SBY-JK, up to 65

in Indonesia is contradictive with the spirit of article 31 of the 1945 Constitution (Kemal, 2008). Education (read: Higher Education) has been a company that commercialize science as a luxury item, which can only be purchased by those who have money. Education has been closed as an entrance road of vertical mobility for the poor to improve their lives.

Another threat to *Pancasila* is that it tends to be used only as a container for a list of common needs without any influence in the implementation. In fact, an ideology ended if its function as guidelines to perform any actions has shifted to be a sole legitimate function. Similar to this is the case of religious political movement that led to the political-authoritarian theocracy, imposes androcentric doctrine, and eliminate anthropocentric one. A new tension in the future most likely comes from the polarization of religious understanding which has mushroomed in the post-New Order. A massive change toward religious conservatism, especially among students at secular universities⁶, is likely to affect the future of democracy in Indonesia.

Toughest Challenge

The Reformation Era, perhaps, is the most sensitive period to the existence of *Pancasila* as a signifier of the plurality in Indonesia. The slogan of Unity in Diversity (*Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*) that became the main icon of this pluralistic country now has been torn apart by the collective egoism in the name of religious spirit. If this condition is still preserved, almost certainly that in the next two or three decades,

percent. SBY-JK (Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono-Yusuf Kala) also sold state own companies, such as PT Garuda Indonesia, PT Krakatau Steel, PT Bank Tabungan Country, PT Yoga Works, and PTPN III, IV, VII. Even, during May 2009, SBY-JK sold 59 oil and natural gas blocks. As a result, of the total of Indonesia oil production (September 2008) amounted to 850,892 barrel per-day, Chevron Pacific Indonesia controlled 425,478 barrel per-day, whereas Pertamina (stated own company) only controlled 108,233 barrels per day.

⁶According to a survey conducted in 2006 by Student and Youth Indonesian Movement (Gerakan Mahasiswa dan Pemuda Indonesia (GMPI)) at the University of Indonesia, ITB, UGM, Airlangga University, UNIBRA, which among others, are known as the important places for political education in Indonesia, shows that approximately 84 percent of students tend to choose Islamic law (Jakarta Charter) rather than *Pancasila* and only 4.6 percent that still choose *Pancasila* as a final ideology for Indonesia. (Kompas, September 2006?)

Indonesia will break out and is segregated into ideological differences. Considering this, the fate of Indonesia will be like Sudan or Pakistan.

On the second issue, particularly in the context of the religious life, apparently it is an area that is currently experiencing a toughest challenge. Religious harmony that was created in the past, although "under the pressure" of the authoritarian ruler of (the New Orde), now, after the valve of democracy is opened, has been torn apart by groups of fundamentalists who continue to inflamed hatred due to differences of beliefs. Intolerance attitude followed by violent actions continues to increase and there is no sign of its decrease.⁷ Violence has become the main instrument to impose fundamentalist beliefs and to haunt the future of multiculturalism in Indonesia.

Actually, the problem of the Islamic renewal is not because of the lack of ideas to reinterpret Islam to face the changing from new values such democracy, gender equality, human rights, but rather on the limited willingness to accept other interpretations which are considered as contrary to their beliefs. Religious communities tend to be very harsh in judging the "liberal" thought which emphasizes the importance of context in interpreting the text, but so permissive towards the violent action that goes beyond the rules of Islam its self.

Of the many distortions that most threaten the diversity of Indonesia is the spreading of intolerant spirit accompanied by violence in the religious life. Violence threatens not only the struggle for having a consolidated democracy, but also can cut off the growing democratic culture. The spirit of tolerance is needed not only as a basis for how the values of democracy developed, but also, in the effort to formulate a common willingness.

Religious Violence and the Anti-Thesis of Democracy

What is clear is that the violence threatens not only the tradition of citizenship that Indonesians proud of, but also the tradition that has been so prominent as the cultural heritage of the Indonesian Muslims, which is their commitment to realize the dream of a multi-ethnic and

⁷Throughout 2010, there have been 117 cases of violence in the name of religion, including destruction to the houses of worship. Meanwhile, the data from Moderate Muslim Society (MMS) states that the action of intolerance in 2010 increased four times higher than in 2009, from 11 to 49 cases (*Kompas.com*).

multi-religious nation. Developments to have by the elites in the political arena are often devastated the progress of civility and religious tolerance that has been achieved (Hefner, 2001: 69).

Violence becomes the antithesis of the democratic system that will be installed. Plurality as one of the pillars to establish democracy scattered by mass violence, especially which is encapsulated with the religious sentiment. Besides threatening the plurality, violence also ripped the tolerance monument which has been the pillar of Indonesian religiosity (Kompas, 4/2/2011).

Thus, the greatest challenge of the transitional democratization in the future is the strengthening of the politics of identity and religious fanaticism that fueled with violence. The authoritarian regime in the past which did not provide a space to any ideological fetus attempting to bring the spirit of the Jakarta Charter back (promoting the implementation of Islamic law), now, the fetus has gained a new *space* after the valve of freedom is open almost without control. The Weakness of the state unable to support the existence of Pancasila as a historical ideology for plural and multicultural Indonesia has led to various attempts to deconstruct it. Pancasila has lost the energy to sustain itself, partly inconsistent performances exhibited by the New Order for a long time.

Although there have been a number of structural changes within the reformation era, that goes nearly thirteen years, mostly are more procedural and artificial. The great transformation which has been taken by the Indonesians since 1998 was apparently resulted in small changes. Even, recently, the government is currently facing the most fundamental crisis, namely the crisis of trust.

The crisis of trust is not only experienced by the executives, but also the legislative and judicative elites. The continuous decline of trust is largely caused by the massive corruption⁸, abuse of power that continues to rampage, the sensitivity dullness of the representatives who only serve their own interests (selfish) and do not have any empathy to the poor, the weak of law enforcement. This situation described the dysfunction of an ideal democracy.

⁸The result from BPK (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan) audit shows that from the 528 objects audited at the first semester in 2010, there are 10,113 cases of budget diversion with the total of IDR 26.12 trillion. Of that amount, Only IDR 93.01 billion or 0,36 per cent has been paid back to the state treasury.

“Justice for all” is still far from reality. “The rule of the law” is continued to be interrupted by the determination of “the rule by law”. Justice has been tainted by numerous distortions, ranging from: “law mafia”, politicization of law and cases and discrimination of law. The law enforcement is only imposed to ordinary people while some privileges are served for those who afford to buy justice.

Deficit Ideology and Religious Orientation Shifts

The political process is currently run as the logical consequence of the democratic project, especially the various local elections (Pilkada) which, on average, has been conducted once in 3 days, has been counterproductive result. This counterproductive are range from money politics as the arena for corruption, exhibition of neo-primordial spirit, rampant spirit of narrow nationalism and collective egoism in the religious spirit, has offered a new vulnerability that potentially being the most troubling problem. Everywhere, the debate over discourse is no longer simply demanding fulfillment of the consistency of Pancasila, but is trying to replace it. Any attempts to achieve civility and an inclusive citizenship as the main requirement of a plural society have become long effort tasks. The thin cultural capital to manage the different opinion and to provide an ability to accept any offer ideas and defeats, has made every event of "democratic party (elections)" haunted by horizontal conflict.

At the level of international politics, the American foreign policy which is seen discriminative, particularly in the settlement of the conflict in the Middle East, has also "encouraged" the proliferation of religious understanding in the form of "religiousness" (sharia mindedness) that tend to deconstruct any ideas considered as western ones such as human rights , gender equality, and democracy. In the midst of this “clash of ideology”, Indonesia has suddenly become a field of ideological struggle between religious fundamentalism, which tries to impose religious private matters to be public ones in the form of district regulation (*peraturan daerah*), and secular fundamentalism that tends to eliminate anything related to religion in the public sphere. Pancasila that asserts Indonesia is not as a secular state and neither a religious one, but has made use to be "middle way" and that’s the most realistic option for Indonesia, until now has been challenged.

On the third problem, the deficit ideology (of Pancasila), which continues to decrease, has been the most serious "threat" - throughout the

history - for the future of Indonesia. It is precisely unknown how the two forces of extremism emerged as a new reality in Indonesia's political and religious life. Moreover, we suddenly face the model of religiosity that is not conducive to the needs of Indonesian people. This religiosity tends to deny the plurality and the multicultural of Indonesia.

This situation seems turning over Geertz's opinion in his book (*Islam Observed, Religious Development in Marocco and Indonesia*, 1968), four decades ago, when this American anthropologist compared Islam in Marocco to Indonesia. According to Geertz, the two countries have a different form of religiosity. In Marocco, the religiosity hard without any compromise. It reflects an aggressive fundamentalism which control the entire population, particularly led by the orthodox followers.

Islamism in Marocco is one type of religious and moral perfectionism stand out as the most persistent to fight for the pure belief in accordance with the Al-Qur'an. Different from that in Marocco, the islamization approach used in Indonesia (especially Java), according to Geertz, is completely different: the approach tends to adjust, to absorb, to be pragmatic, and to take a gradual efforts and to do partial compromise with other entities. The result is the form of Islamism which does not presume to be the pure doctrine but comprehensive; does not over reactive but a tolerant one. Now, after four decades, the condition tends to reverse. Marocco is likely to be Indonesia and Indonesia tends to be Marocco. Within this shifting process, unfortunately, *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU) and *Muhammadiyah*, which are portrayed as the icon of moderate and progressive Islam seems to be just a spectator. As both do not have a blue print of tolerant and inclusive form of Islam, which should be restored as the "trade mark" of Islam in Indonesia.

Indeed, the mainstream groups of Muslim in Indonesia are still consider Pancasila as the final ideology for Muslims in Indonesia. Even, Nurcholish Madjid, a prominent Muslim scholar in Indonesia stated that in other Islamic countries, "the Universal Declaration of Human Rights" is considered as "Islamic". The late researcher from LIPI (Indonesian Institute of Sciences) also stated that the "Medina Charter" or the "Constitution of Medina" is similar Pancasila. Even though, the MUI (the Indonesian Ulama/Muslim Council) because the representatives of Islamic organizations in Indonesia, ironically issued a fatwa forbidding Pluralism, because those two are stated that every religion is the same (cultural relativism).

Islam and the Clash of Civilization?

There are some factors that involved in lubricating the transmission of Salafi ideas in Indonesia, which are so complex: from the empty political space after the collapse of the New Order to the international problem derived from of the ambiguous attitude toward the West (America) in Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This is considered as reflecting the western hegemony on the Islamic world and therefore the intense ideological export of the Salafi ideology (Wahabi) from the Middle East since the 1990s, become the clash of cultures, by and large, coloring the shifting process. Yet, this does not necessarily mean to prove Huntington's prediction (1993) about the clash of civilization as a truth prophecy.

In fact, Huntington's prediction tends to create and to strengthen the negative impression on Islam, which in turn becomes the legitimacy of radical groups to justify their fight against the West, rather than merely as a cultural forecast. The story about the incompatibility of Islam and democracy that is derive from a monolithic understanding of Islam, does not only undermine the fact that the world's largest country by Muslim population like Indonesia is currently implementing democracy, but also denies the affinity of Islam with democratic principles, in which Islam contains values such as: *al-'adalah* (justice), *at-tawassuth* (moderate), *at-tasaamuh* (tolerance), *shura* (democracy) which are clearly compatible with democracy.

That prediction also, indirectly, inflames a situation to the need to have a single identity, inspired by "Ichwanul Muslimin" and/or other "Salafi" movements. Huntington's thesis unconsciously rendered a service to the maintenance of a *stereotyping* or negative image to both parties. The inability to comprehend Islam with it all variations and/or incapability to conceive the West with it all kinds, is more likely to perpetuate "war of discourse" that creating hatred.

The difficulty with thesis begins with the presumption of the unique relevance of singular classification... "In partitioning the population of the world into belonging to "the Islamic world", "the Western world", "the Hindu world". "the Budhist world", the divisive power of classificatory priority is implicitly used to place people firmly inside a unique of rigid boxes...The basic flaw of the thesis much precedes the point whee it is asked whether civilization must clash" (Sen, 2006:11).

All of these are still in a puzzle: is it true that liberal democracy cannot be compromised with neo-fundamentalist that utilizes religious values in designing political realities? Even though, it is clear that neo-fundamentalist is not far Indonesia's future (Madjid, 1999), the formulation of it dreams in many ways can answer the moral crisis in Indonesia. The consistence discussion between doctrine and actions is not only be a filter for the pursued of secularism and puritanism, in straggling verbally value system, but it also helps minimizing moral crisis such as corruption, feeling of shameless which has been striking in Indonesia to date.

The imbalance development of liberal Islamic discourse which putting verbal symbols into the context—set aside all of its shortcomings—which is continually receiving intimidation, in the form of symbolic violent, name it, *labeling* as “western lackey” (antek barat) with its secular values which is streaming to view that “all religions are the same”, and persistent thread of assassination.⁹ The lack of supporting the idea on the importance of tolerance to difference faiths is a very serious threat to creating brotherhood among different religious followers today. The unfair or imbalance dialectical processes are clearly close up the emergence of the needed alternative thoughts. The issue here is not merely on whether Liberal Islam or Islamic Liberal (progressive ones) has its place in Indonesia, but, it is more to the restless situation due to the absence of public spheres which are free from religious teachings that claim as the only truth on behalf of religion's doctrines. This tendency of narrowing the public sphere is not only happened in schools as agents of socialization: from the first grade to University, but in a limited phase, it

⁹ The most apprehensive is that the tradition of “suicide bombing” that never existing before in the history of Islam in Indonesia, all of sudden to be new horrible phenomena. Suicide bombing firstly happened on October 12 2002 (called: Bom Bali I), in Paddy's Café and Seri Club, Bali, where 202 dead and 123 injured. On august 5, 2003 (called “Bom Marriot), in Hotel JW Marriot, Jakarta, 11 dead, 154 wounded. On September 9,2004 (called: Bom Kuningan), in front of Australian embassy Office, Jakarta, 9 dead, and 161 injured. On October 1, 2005 (called: Bom Bali II), at Raja's and Restaurant, Menega's, and Noman's Café, Bali, 25 dead, 102 wounded. On july 17, 2009 (called: Bom Megakuningan) in JW Marriot and Ritz Carlton Hotels, Jakarta 9 deads, and 55 injured. The most recent one happened on April 15, 2011, in the Mosque at Mapolres Kota Cirebon, west Jawa, 1 dead, while 27 wounded (Kompas, 16/4/2011).

also occurred in religious boarding schools (*pesantren*), as the main agent and a source of Islamic values in Indonesia.

Public universities in several well known university such as ITB, UGM, ITS, UNIBRA, UNAIR, IPB, and UNDIP have been dominated by Ichwanul Muslim's and created paradox attitudes. In one hand, religious doctrines and monolith socialization system limited to give a chance to discuss comparison among Islamic sects ("madzab") and has creating dualism. **Firstly**, attitude that give more priority to behave rather than to discourse, has positively contributed to create the student's behavior changed toward better Islamic. At this dimension, this phenomenon has promising much hope, especially the existence of new generation who are more firm in holding principles of morality, loyal in fighting for their dreams, disciplines, professional and well-organized. **Secondly**, the fervent of the transformation on traditional religious teachings model from ("sami'na wa atho'na --listen and obey--, as *taken for granted*; limited model of democracy implemented in real life; the power of "murobi" (mentor) shadows whose control all students' behaviors and their way of thinking), to political parties intervenes on the what the students' may and may not do in responding national political issues, are all clearly hindrances the emergence of new thoughts. Democracy is, as if being laminar. Democracy may be practiced in campus but it is prohibited to disobey "murobi", "uztadz" and "majlis sura" (the highest rank in religious organizations). Above all, this attitude brings about side effects. There is a polarization between "we" (nahnu) and "they" (antum) in the part of students that can bring about exclusivism as a source of intolerance. In addition the fanatic understanding of religious values locked up by "bai'at" (take an oath/*sumpah setia*) tends to drive closed mind (monopoly of the truth) in facing other perspectives.

On the other hand, the final pursue to apply Islamic syari'at (Islamic law) in their own version ("Islamic state") through a "hidden agenda" is most likely to be "constraint ideology" that will threaten the multicultural Indonesia's disintegration.

One of the psychological apprehensions that could be an aspiration buffer is that every religious ideology discourse tends to offer "holy war", "jihad" that close the broader and deeper interpretation to the God messages. In political dimension, instrumentation of religious ideology has developed the spirit of formalized syari'ah law that creates religious

fanatism, which reject rationality and rule of law as a way of creating the harmony of public life. One of the religious fanaticism forms is the mushroom of utilizing religious values and morality as the basis for issuing district's rules after the birth of law number 22 1999 (*Undang-Undang Nomor 22 Tahun 1999*) on District Autonomy (Perda) -- *Perda Syariah*. There are at least 12 provinces which all issues "Perda Islamic syariah": Aceh, Riau, Bengkulu, West Sumatera, South Sumatera, Lampung, Banten, West Java, East Java, and South Kalimantan. Those policies are at province level (6 policies), District level (34 policies), and Municipalities (2 policies). Those policies are often evolving new problems such as gender inequality and the limitation of women's freedom in public spheres. For instance: regulation for women to wear clothing and women's criminalization as arousing a lust (Yudi Latif 2008: 9).

Even though a part of those phenomena object of is a response to the secularism which is built-in modernization, but making religious ideology of some kind is also the sign of the failure to interpret Al-Qur'an, which values are not discriminate women. Verbalism (textual interpretation) basically will be easily trapped to the danger of making operational which hold religion as a doctrine that close the principle of "*likulli zaman wa makan*" (the universality of religious values is beyond the place and time). Even though "Indonesia is not a religious country and not a secular one" is as a middle way to accommodate diversity, but empirical elaboration of the middle way tends to ignore protecting minority groups. In the case of dealing with "different sect" such as *Ahmadiyah*, for example, the state position tends to be some kind of "the only religion's holder" that acts beyond its capacity. Government's indifference to the violently attack *Ahmadiyah* by community was clearly violate democratic values.

In this dimension, the need for building "partnerships" between neo-fundamentalist and neo-Islamic liberal becomes important to formulate. Although they have several ideological belief differences between them, in terms of different political formulation that not to be easy to be compromised.¹⁰ However, as the majority groups, there is a

¹⁰ For traditionalist Muslims, Al-Qur'an is the absolute basis of science about universe. The traditional position is that knowledge is given either by revelation or reason, and opinion is not knowledge. Knowledge means the correct representation of the world, free error and without the distortion of

need to prove that Islam is a religion for the universe “*rahmatan lil alamin*” or blessing for the universe. As long as the spirit of creating “the blessing for the universe is absent, then the future of democracy in Indonesia will be gloomy.

Closing

What we need is *the third way* that can bridge the gap between secular values and religious values. From the secular perspective, the state should not function as the judge of faiths and neither a religion definition maker, but it must be as a mediator and regulator. On the contrary, morality values can't be withdrawn from public spheres. Religion must consistently be put on as one source of law but it is not the only law of institution such as “Perda Syari'ah” and/or religion state.

To develop this kind of perspectives, there are several big agendas needed as follows: **Firstly**, democracy as a planned political system has to embrace multicultural ideality or “unity in diversity” -- *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* --, that needs socialization from Elementary schools to the Universities. These education institutions are important agents of socialization, but uniformity, which is only stressing exclusivity, must be avoided because it could develop the feeling of hatred to other different beliefs. Besides there is the need to develop “*soft de-radicalization*” by implanting affinity between Islamic values such as Madinah Charter and Pancasila or Indonesia's five principles as political consensus of Indonesia. It requires the importance of emphasizing of the universal values amongst different religions rather than sharpening ritual differences. In addition, it is necessary to widen public spheres as a way for civil society to return Islamic characteristics as the characteristic of Islam in Indonesia as moderate, inclusive and respected tradition.

Secondly, religious conservatism is trying to turn back the history by romantizing the 7th century classical Islam with Arabian tradition,

perspective, intentionality, or physical frailty... Faith is not opinion to true believer. Islam is cannot be matter opinion. The can be no opinion regarding theoretical absolute or revealed truth... While for liberal Muslims, Al-Qur'an is equal to divine revelation (wahyu), but its substance and the meaning of divine revelation is not harfiah-verbal (textual). Meanwhile liberalism treats religion as opinion and, therefore tolerates diversity in precisely those realms traditional belief insists upon without equivocation. See Leonard Binder, “Islamic Liberalism”, University of Chicago Press, 1988.

with minimum strategic adaptation in facing the changing era. Islamization in by model tends to be viewed as an alternative way due to stagnant modernism. If the spirit of textualization which absolutism in interpretation by easily stereotyped a person as atheis who have different faiths, would falls into instrumentation of violence, and would disrupt the need to established democracy cultures. Democratic institutions that inherited from the new order can be deconstruct through the spirit of theocracy with cauties to anti democracy, pluralism, multicultural that contradict to the need of Indonesia. If this is what's going to happen then we are not only will trap to ideological friction, but also will continuously our diversity face violence. To restrain worst scenario to happen, we needs to enhance interfaith dialogue amongst different faiths at the places of religion teachings, especially in Islamic boarding schools (*Pesantren*). There is a need to create dialectical discussion between Islamic and modern values such as Human Rights issues, at Islamic Boarding Schools, is not only because Islamic traditional schools have significant amount of their students about 23.000 Islamic traditional schools with more than 5 millions students-- santri, but it also due to the fact that these Islamic institutions will hold key explanation about how to put the values contradiction between fundamentalist Islam and liberalist Islam in harmony.

Thirdly, Pancasila or Indonesia's five principles at present is suffers from legitimately crisis and losing its function as a reference for the state and people behaviors, Pancasila needs dual revitalization as follows: Firstly, internally, Pancasila is open ideology as the main reference must be utilized maximally for a critical tool to the whole government policies. Secondly, externally, Pancasila has to combine and at the same time to reduce two tendencies of being extreme in certain Islamic sect. The comprehension of Puritanism has changed religiosity formulation from: inclusive, tolerance, syncretism to religiosity which tends to be: exclusive, intolerance, anti-nationalist, anti-democracy and anti-tradition. Their a need to "deradicalization". On the other hand, to the extremism from "*politics of recognition*" in "*queer theory*" which demanding trans-gender, bi-sexual as parts of secularism that ignoring ethics-religious in public sphere (Gerung, 2008) is clearly away from religious authority and make religion is threatened by secularism demand. At this point, desecularism needs to be taken.

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